The GDPR – a guide for park owners

It may not be the first thing a park owner thinks about, but data protection laws here in the UK apply as much to holiday and home parks as they do to any other business sector.  In May next year the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) will come into effect and is set to introduce some significant changes.

The impact of these changes and identifying what issues are relevant will be a challenge for many park owners.  So what is changing and what should you be doing now to make sure that next year does not hold any nasty surprises?

Does the GDPR apply to me?

The answer is almost certainly yes.  The obligations of GDPR fall on all organisations which process personal data regardless of their size or type.  “Processing” includes using data in almost any way whatsoever (including receiving it, storing it, copying it and destroying it); personal data is any information from which a living individual can be identified.  Those definitions are very broad and as a park owner or operator you are almost certainly subject to the GDPR and everything in it.  

Brexit and GDPR

One thing to note at the outset is that there is almost no chance of the GDPR going away.  Technically it is already part of UK law and both the government and the Information Commissioner have made it clear that it will come into force as planned, regardless of how Brexit negotiations go.  Even if there was a complete change of direction, you would still have to comply with the GDPR if you sell goods or services to EU citizens.

The changes: rights of individuals

In a nutshell, old rights are being strengthened and new rights being introduced.  There is a new “right to be forgotten” which gives individuals the right to require you to remove their data from your systems and the right to data portability, designed to allow individuals to obtain and reuse their personal data for their own purposes across different services.  Subject Access Requests, which are nothing new, will have to be complied with in less time (one month as opposed to 40 days) and the right to impose a fee of up to £10 is being removed.


Even where individuals’ rights remain the same, the obligations placed on organisations in relation to them are set to become stricter. Keeping a record of the decisions you make regarding data protection is now a legal requirement, as is maintaining records of what data you have and why you have it. Much more information is now expected to be provided to individuals as well in the form of privacy policies.

It is important to note that these obligations apply regardless of the size of your operation.

What to do now? 

  1. Make sure that the key decision makers are aware of data protection generally and that the law is changing in less than a year. Provide staff training to those who handle the data on a day to day basis and ensure they are up to speed with the obligations on the business and the way to use/store data that is obtained.
  2. Assess what information you have, where it came from and who you share it with. What you will need to do will depend on the data that you have.
  3. Document the result of your assessment.
  4. Check that you have privacy policies in place and if so that they set out the basis for processing data and what you do with it.
  5. Familiarise yourself with the rights of individuals and satisfy yourself that you can deal with a request for those rights to be acted on. If you are a large operator, you should have written procedures in place to do so and make sure that your employees recognise such a request if one comes in.
  6. Make sure you know what to do if there is a data breach (for example, if an individual’s data goes astray). Put a procedure in place to deal with reporting and investigating a breach.
  7. Record everything you do. Accountability, being able to show what you have done to comply with your obligations, will be vital.
  8. Don’t leave everything until the last minute do a data protection audit now!
Phil Gorski

Phil Gorski

Phil Gorski
Holiday and Home Parks Team
0113 227 9318

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Rugby Union doing a ‘Neymar’

There has been something in the water this summer, in the parallel transfer markets of rugby union and football.

In the latter, Neymar Jr. transferred to PSG in a deal worth an eye-watering £370m, a sum of money inconceivable within world rugby. For context, Sunderland A.F.C, currently have their entire football club for sale, including squad and stadium, for £170m.

Traditionally, rugby union players in England’s professional leagues have moved between clubs by way of ‘free transfers’. Something commonplace in football, which had not previously been seen in rugby union, is a release clause triggered upon promise of a certain transfer fee by the buying club. It was this mechanism which facilitated Neymar’s move away from the Nou Camp. His £199.1m release fee was supposed to act as a deterrent, but Qatari Sports Investment, the financier of PSG, instead saw it as an affordable opportunity to generate publicity and revenue. Leicester Tigers earlier this summer shrewdly used a largely unknown regulation in the Premiership code of conduct which allowed a player to be bought out of their playing contract by another club for a set fee. This fee was a one-off payment of a season’s earnings for what the player was being offered by the purchasing club or his current salary for a season, whichever was the higher.

The regulation was in place with the view to protect the interests of backroom staff and had not been drafted with players in contemplation. The 12 Premiership clubs unanimously supported that the regulation be amended to prevent such transfers being triggered again in the future.

There has been an emerging global trend of rugby players moving clubs before the end of their contracts. Perhaps the clearest illustration of this shift in culture is Louis Picamoles of Northampton Saints signing a pre-contract agreement with Montpellier, despite having three years left on his existing deal. The compensation sum required from Montpellier to free him from his Saints contract would take the form of a seven-figure sum, making him rugby’s first £1million player, and rugby’s equivalent of football’s Trevor Francis 38 years earlier.

Within the last year we have seen Carl Fearns backtrack on his contractual agreement to return from France to Gloucester because of Lyon’s willingness to foot the bill of his U-turn, and perhaps more incredulous was Denny Solomona ‘retirement’ from rugby league in order to walk away from his contract with Castleford Tigers and join rugby union side Sale Sharks. This left his former club without any compensation immediately following his departure and the ‘League Leaders’ were left with no recourse but to issue legal proceedings. The outcome was a hefty out of court settlement for the Tigers who had lost the services of Super League’s top try scorer from last season with two seasons left to run on his deal.

These behaviours are symptoms of a market desperate to follow the precedents set by the round ball game following the hike in the salary cap ceiling and the surge in TV revenue. Rugby players and their agents are now acutely aware of not only the enlarged salaries on offer, but of other clubs’ willingness to swoop in and free them from the contracts they are currently bound to.

Andy Boyde

Andy Boyde

Andy Boyde
Sports Law
0113 227 9319


Contribution from Tom Grahamslaw

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Foot Dragging On Mediation Will Not Be Tolerated

The Court of Appeal recently reminded litigants that they must give mediation proper consideration and that anything less will result in cost penalties being imposed.

In the recent case of Thakkar v Patel, the claimant owned a building that was leased to the defendant.  The property was vandalised and as a consequence suffered flooding.  The claimant delayed carrying out repairs for several months during which time the building could not be used. The lease subsequently came to an end and the claimant made a £210,000 claim for dilapidations.   The defendant counterclaimed for £41,875 in respect of rent which it had paid when the premises could not be used.

The claimant proposed mediation and, following an initial agreement to mediate, was proactive in making arrangements and identifying possible mediators.  The defendant, by contrast, was slow to respond and raised hurdles that ultimately frustrated the claimant’s efforts.  The claimant eventually lost patience and told the defendant that they no longer had any confidence that mediation could be arranged.

At trial, both parties were successful with their respective claims.  The claimant was awarded £44,933.52 and the defendant was awarded £16,750 on their counterclaim.

In deciding the issue of costs, the court examined the parties’ conduct in relation to mediation.  It found that neither had refused to engage in mediation or ignored the request to consider it.  However, the claimant had been more proactive and, by contrast, the defendant was unenthusiastic and had shown no flexibility when it came to agreeing the mediation arrangements.  The court considered that there had been real prospects of a settlement being achieved had the parties engaged in mediation.   For those reasons, it held that the defendant should pay 75% of the claimant’s costs and the claimant should pay the costs of the defendant’s counterclaim.  The defendant appealed.

The Court of Appeal held that the vast majority of the costs of the proceedings would have been saved had there been a settlement and, while the decision to penalise the defendant in costs was tough, it was not so tough as to warrant interference by it.  The appeal was therefore dismissed.

In a clear warning to all litigants, Lord Justice Jackson stated: “…in a case where bilateral negotiations fail but mediation is obviously appropriate, it behoves both parties to get on with it. If one party frustrates the process by delaying and dragging its feet for no good reason, that will merit a costs sanction. 

This case acts as a reminder to all parties that they are required to give proper consideration to mediation.  Avoiding it is not an option.  The parties cannot ignore a request to mediate; they cannot blankly refuse to mediate; they should engage in the process rather than simply pay lip service to it.  Failure to do so will result in costs penalties being awarded against them.

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Luke Patel

Luke Patel
Commercial Dispute Resolution Team
0113 227 9316

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Naming or shaming?

Choosing baby names: a legal battle in the making?

Adolf, Elvis, Madonna.  Upon hearing these names most of us will immediately think of the public figures behind them.  But why do we automatically draw (good or bad) connotations from names?  Aren’t they just names?  Or is there more to them?

Names are our identity and in some cultures, are thought to determine our destiny.  They can have religious or sentimental meaning, reflect a person’s class or just be different to the norm (think Gwyneth Paltrow and Chris Martin’s daughter, Apple, or Jamie and Jools Oliver’s daughter, River Rocket).

Names can be a sticking point for people and are often legally changed.  Many celebrities have changed their names, for example, actor and all-round cool guy Jamie Foxx is actually Eric Marlon Bishop.  Is Jamie Foxx a ‘better’ name?  He obviously thought so.

Names are important to people and adults can legally change their name by deed poll but, what about children?

Can a parent change their child’s name?

Whether a parent can change their child’s name depends on who has parental responsibility (“PR”) for the child.

If both parents are married then they both have PR.  If they both agree to the change then they can legally change their child’s name.

If the parents are not married but both have PR for the child (because the father is on the birth certificate or there is a court order in place) both must consent to the change of name (preferably in writing) for it to be allowed in law.

If an unmarried mother wishes to change the name and the father does not have PR then she can legally change the name without consent.  However, the father could apply to court to prohibit this from happening, so it is best practice to get consent.

If there is an existing Child Arrangements Order in place then no person can change the child’s surname without the consent of all people with PR or without permission of the court.

If everyone with PR agrees to the name change then you can just start using the name or, for the purpose of official organisations (such as the Passport Office), you could have a change of name deed prepared.

What if one parent objects?

If a person with PR will not consent then an application for permission can be made to the court.  When the court is deciding whether to grant an application to change a child’s name, the primary consideration is the child’s welfare and whether the use of a name is in the child’s best interests, not the parents.

This issue often arises in the case of separated parents where one parent wants to revert to the use of their maiden name for the child’s surname or where one parent re-marries and wants to change the child’s surname to that of their new spouse.  However, a court should not make an order to change a child’s surname unless there is some evidence that it would lead to an improvement in their welfare.  In practice, it is extremely hard to change a child’s surname if parents with PR do not agree.  This is due to the long-term interests of a child in retaining an outward link with the parent with whom that child does not live.

The court recently considered the welfare of the child when a mother applied to change her child’s middle name because it was associated with a “notorious” public figure.   The father would not consent to the change as he liked using the child’s middle name.   However, the court allowed the change, explaining that whilst the name was not offensive per se it “was infected with bad connotations” and was enough for the use of the name to harm the child’s emotional welfare in the future.  The name was not made public so we can only speculate as to whom it related.

This case illustrates just how important it is to choose the right name for your child and the difficulties faced by parents in changing a child’s name when the other parent objects.

Anna Rhodes

Anna Rhodes
Family Team
0113 227 9251

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Weet-a-bots – cereals in disguise

The recent seizing of 300 boxes of Weetabix by New Zealand customs officials has highlighted the importance of brand protection and ensuring that your brand is protected in all territories in which you trade.

The boxes of Weetabix were imported by a specialist shop in Christchurch which carved out a niche for itself by selling UK versions of products to the local expat community.  As many people are aware, food manufacturers often tweak recipes in different countries taking into account things taste as well as permitted ingredients.

Weetabix are generally not sold in New Zealand due to the owners of the Weetbix brand (Sanitarium) having a registered trademark and because of the similarity between the brand names.  Incidentally, this is also the reason that Weetbix are not sold in the UK – because Weetabix has the registered trademark.

Although trademark law can differ from country to country, the general principles remain broadly the same.  Namely, you can only register a name or logo that is original, that is not descriptive of the goods or services and does not infringe another name or logo in a similar class of services.

The important point in this case being the similarity between Weetabix and Weetbix – and as a result this falls fouls not only on the basis of similarity but because of what is known as the common law tort of passing off.  This protects a brand from another brand benefitting from its goodwill.   It allows the owner of the brand to take a number of different steps to protect their brand such as here, where Sanitarium sought and were granted an injunction, which then gave Customs the ability to seize the goods and prevent them from being sold.

As this situation highlights, trademark law gives the owner of the trademark very broad protection in terms of the exploitation of the brand.  It protects not only against rival manufacturers – such as Weetabix in the UK and Weetbix in New Zealand – but also protects others who are trying to bring in infringing goods into the territory in which you have the protection.

So what do we recommend?

We always recommend that you carry out regular health checks on your brand:

  • Do you have a unique business name, logo or slogan that you would like protecting?
  • Do you regularly bring out new goods or services – could they be protected?
  • Are you aware of any rival companies using your brand or something that is similar to it and if so, would you like to stop them?

    Pete Konieczko-Hansom

Pete Konieczko-Hansom
Corporate and Commercial Team
0113 227 9384

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Dance of the Corporate Veils

The “corporate veil” is the principle by which the liabilities of a limited company cannot be pursued against directors or shareholders, who are not personally liable for actions conducted within the normal course of their roles.

UK legal history includes numerous attempts to “pierce the corporate veil”, often when the company in question is insolvent, leaving creditors unable to recover their debts but allowing directors and shareholders to walk away unscathed despite their possible responsibility for the company’s collapse.

In a recent case, Housemaker Services Ltd v Cole, the court considered the extent of the veil. The claimant company was a building firm that had been dissolved following a failure to file accounts and reinstated 20 months later to pursue a claim against a client who was in dispute regarding the quality of building works. The company had a single director and early work was conducted between Cole and the director as a sole trader, before the company was incorporated and raised the later unpaid invoices.

The initial matter before the court was an application to allow a claim to be made outside the usual limitation period. The court refused the application and ordered the company to pay the defendant’s costs in relation to it, which of course was worth little given the company’s financial position.

Cole then applied to the court to join the director as a second claimant and apply the costs order to him directly on the basis that the company was purely a legal construct for his business, there was no real distinction between the man and the company, and the director had funded the litigation and would be the chief beneficiary had it succeeded.

On the face of it, this seems a relatively extreme case where a dissolved company is brought “back from the dead” so that (on Cole’s case) a sole director could use it as a vehicle to pursue an unsuccessful claim for long-disputed fees. However, the judge followed the courts’ general reluctance to breach the veil and refused to expose the director to any personal liability – it held that an additional component of bad faith, such as improper conduct or the claim not being truly for the benefit of the company (even if it was a very thin shell around the director) was required.

When threatened with a claim brought by a company that will never be able to satisfy a costs order, is there any other remedy? At an early stage, it may be worth the defendant applying for an order for security for costs. This order would require the claimant to pay funds into court to be used to satisfy any subsequent costs order, or else abandon the claim. Courts can be reluctant to make such orders, however, and unfortunately one reason for refusal can be that the inability of the claimant to make such a payment should not be a bar to its right to seek justice.

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Luke Patel

Luke Patel
Commercial Dispute Resolution Team
0113 227 9316

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Choppers no longer grounded

Noisy neighbours can be a real problem for those unfortunate enough to have to live next door to them.  Going to court to deal with the problem is always a last resort.  If you do however need to pursue court proceedings then there are two main remedies available: you can either pursue a claim for damages or apply for an injunction.

Damages are a monetary award designed to compensate the injured party for the noise which it has suffered.  An injunction is an order from the court requiring the recipient to cease the action complained of.  Case law indicates that the court is more likely to award damages than to grant an injunction when faced with nuisance claims.   This notion has been reinforced by the recent case of Peires v Bickerton’s Aerodromes Limited.

Mrs Peires was the owner of land next to an aerodrome.  She complained about the noise generated by exercises being carried out by helicopters there.  The helicopters would land, take off, hover, turn through 180 degrees and land again.   The manoeuvres took place on a slope (towards the boundary of Mrs Peires’ property) because part of the mandatory training requirements for a helicopter pilot is landing and taking off from sloping ground.  Mrs Peires claimed that the noise created by the helicopters made it impossible for her use the garden or to sell her property.  She therefore sought an injunction against the owners of the aerodrome.

Initially, Mrs Peires was successful; the High Court granted her an injunction which allowed the helicopter training to continue but limited the times that it could take place.  The Judge rejected Bickerton’s Aerodromes’ defence that it had statutory immunity under the Civil Aviation Act 1982 (which prevents claims being brought in trespass or in nuisance against aircrafts flying over someone’s property) on the basis that the exercise being carried out by the helicopters on the slope did not involve any “flight” within the meaning of the Act.  The Judge felt that the appropriate remedy was an injunction rather than awarding Mrs Peires damages as damages would have left her with continued noise.  The defendant appealed.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and lifted the injunction.  It found that the Judge had been wrong in his interpretation of the Act – there was no justification when considering a defence under the Act for confining it to noise in the context of lateral travel from one fixed point to another.  The helicopters had been “in flight” and therefore the defence under the Act was available.

The decision illustrates how difficult it is to obtain an injunction in this type of case.

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Luke Patel

Luke Patel
Commercial Dispute Resolution Team
0113 227 9316

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